

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 302573

40

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/C:RFANDREW:OSM

APPROVED BY AF:AMB. MULCAHY

EUR/RPM - MR. HOLMES

P - MR. SISCO

C - H SONNENFELDT

S/S - MR. ORTZ

----- 024721

P 241654Z DEC 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 302573

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, AO, NATO, UR, CU

SUBJECT: US POSITION ON ANGOLA

REF: BONN 20702 (NOTAL)

1. DEPARTMENT WISHES TO CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON ANGOLA WITH KEY CONCERNED NATO STATES AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM IN SUPPORT OF OUR INITIATIVES. AMBASSADOR SHOULD APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENT AT HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO CONVEY FOLLOWING:

2. MILITARY SITUATION: SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY SUPPORT FOR MPLA CONTINUES TO ARRIVE IN ANGOLA, BUT HAS NOT PRODUCED DRAMATIC CHANGES ON THE GROUND. MPLA/CUBAN ADVANCE ON FNLA MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AT AMBRIZ HAS MADE NO HEAD-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 302573

WAY IN PAST WEEK OR MORE. UNITA/SOUTH AFRICAN DRIVE

TOWARD LUANDA CAME TO HALT 180 MILES SOUTH OF LUANDA THREE WEEKS AGO AND HAS NOT RESUMED. LUSO, A KEY EASTERN TOWN ON THE BENGUELA RAILROAD HAS FALLEN TO UNITA FORCES AGAIN, AND MUCH OF THE RAILROAD IS CLEARED FOR TRAFFIC. HOWEVER, MPLA CONTINUES TO CONTROL EXTREME EASTERN END OF RAILROAD, IN FACT, BLOWN BRIDGES AND HEAVY RAINS ARE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN GENERAL SLOWDOWN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ON ALL FRONTS.

3. AIRLIFTS: WE HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN TO IMPEDE OR END SOVIET AND CUBAN AIRLIFTS TO ANGOLA. WE HAVE SENT STRONG MESSAGES TO YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY, ALGERIA, MALI AND GUINEA CONVEYING OUR INDIGNATION OVER THEIR PERMITTING SOVIETS OR CUBANS TO USE THEIR AIR SPACE OR EVEN AIRFIELDS IN THIS CONNECTION. WE HAVE WARNED THEM THAT THIS WILL AFFECT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IF IT CONTINUES. NOW THAT BARBADOS HAS FINALLY FORBIDDEN ITS AIRPORT TO CUBANS, WE HAVE TALKED TO GUYANA, TRINIDAD AND SURINAM GOVTS IN EFFORT TO ASSURE CUBANS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO USE AIRPORTS IN THEIR COUNTRIES AS STOPOVERS FOR AIRLIFT OF CUBAN TROOPS TO ANGOLA. WE BELIEVE THE PORTUGUESE WILL ALSO FORBID USE OF AZORES TO ANY CUBAN-ANGOLAN BOUND FLIGHTS. WE ARE CONTINUING TO MONITOR SITUATION CAREFULLY.

4. RECOGNITION: WE ARE URGING THUS FAR UNCOMMITTED OAU HEADS OF STATE TO HOLD LINE OF OAU CONCILIATION COMMISSION AND REFRAIN FROM RECOGNIZING CLAIMS OF MPLA TO REPRESENT ANGOLAN PEOPLE. OUR VIEW IS THAT OAU RECOGNITION OF MPLA WOULD SO HARDEN MPLA POSITION AS TO MAKE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IMPOSSIBLE, AND WOULD THUS ENCOURAGE MORE FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND BLOODSHED. SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT HAS SHAKEN SOME KEY AFRICAN STATES WHICH HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO REMAIN ON FENCE (NOTABLY NIGERIA AND GHANA). NIGERIA AND GHANA HAVE NOW RECOGNIZED MPLA. THERE IS WORRISOME

SLIPPAGE HERE, AND WE ARE CONCERNED. SECRETARY KISSINGER  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 302573

HAS SAID PUBLICLY ON TWO OCCASIONS RECENTLY (DEC. 19 AND 23) THAT US WANTS WITHDRAWAL OF OUTSIDE FORCES, AND HE HAS INCLUDED SOUTH AFRICANS ALONG WITH SOVIETS AND CUBANS IN THIS STATEMENT. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE EMBARRASSMENT CAUSED BY SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE AT SIDE OF UNITA, BUT NEED FOR SOME KIND OF MILITARY BALANCE SEEMS TO US OVERRIDING FOR MOMENT.

5. OUR HOPE IS THAT IF MILITARY STALEMATE CAN BE MAINTAINED ON GROUND, AND IF MPLA CAN BE PREVENTED FROM OBTAINING OAU RECOGNITION, OAU WILL HAVE AT LEAST SOME SCOPE FOR EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE THREE FACTIONS: FNLA, UNITA, AND MPLA. IF OAU CALLS ON UN FOR HELP, POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL, IN ARRANGING CEASEFIRE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WE WILL OF COURSE SUPPORT THEIR REQUEST.

6. SOVIETS: WE HAVE MADE SEVERAL APPROACHES DIRECTLY TO SOVIETS IN ORDER TO GET THEM TO BACK AWAY. THEIR REPLIES HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFACTORY. THEY PRETEND TO SEE NO CONFLICT BETWEEN WHAT THEY ARE DOING IN ANGOLA AND SPIRIT OF DETENTE WHICH THEY CLAIM TO RESPECT. WE PLAN ANOTHER, STRONGER APPROACH TO SOVIETS IN NEAR FUTURE.

7. CONGRESS: THE SENATE DECISION OF LAST WEEK HAS IN NO WAY WEAKENED OUR DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH OUR PROGRAM OF ASSISTING FNLA AND UNITA TO OPPOSE MPLA/SOVIET TAKE-OVER IN ANGOLA. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT FUNDS REMAINING AT OUR DISPOSAL TO SUPPORT OUR CURRENT ENDEAVORS IN ANGOLA, AND WE WILL USE THEM. WHEN CONGRESS RECONVENES, WE WILL GO TO HOUSE, WHERE WE HAVE MANY STRONG SUPPORTERS, AND MAKE VERY SERIOUS EFFORT TO GET PURSE STRINGS UNTIED. WE ARE REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC OF SUCCESS.

8. WE WOULD WELCOME SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS OF OUR ALLIES AND SERIOUSLY URGE THEM TO CONSIDER WHAT MORE THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO TO HELP-- DIPLOMATICALLY, MILITARILY, FINANCIALLY-- TO OPPOSE THIS SOVIET/CUBAN ADVENTURE IN ANGOLA.

9. FOR BONN: USE FOREGOING AS INTERIM REPLY TO GERMAN  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 302573

DEMARCHE REPORTED REFTEL-

10. FOR USNATO: AMBASSADOR BRUCE IS REQUESTED TO  
BRIEF LUNS ORPANSA ON FOREGOING. KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** INTERVENTION, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, LIBERATION FRONTS, POLITICAL SITUATION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 DEC 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ElyME  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE302573  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** RFANDREW:OSM  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750447-0339  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751214/aaaaalvi.tel  
**Line Count:** 158  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** 75 BONN 20702  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ElyME  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23 APR 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <22 OCT 2003 by ElyME>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US POSITION ON ANGOLA  
**TAGS:** PFOR, AO, UR, CU, US, NATO, UNITA, MPLA, FNLA  
**To:** NATO BRUSSELS MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006